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Editorial
"Culture", says a lecturer in a cartoon by the
New York artist Ben Shahn, "is Actones, Epi-
sodes, Nodes, Nodal Chains, Scenes, Serials,
Nomoclones, Permaclones, Paragroups, Nomo-
clonic Types, Permaclonic Types, Permaclonic
Systems and Permaclonic Supersystems. Culture
is also Phonemes, Morphemes, Words, Semanti-
cally Equivalent Utterances, Behaviour Plans and
MANY OTHER EMIC THINGS".
The lecturer, under his academic robes, is a
solemn, long-necked, myopic stork. Only a bird-
brain, is the message, could be capable of such
stupendous gobblydegook.
It is sad that a concept should be so abused as
the word "culture" is, both by those who so
enthusiastically make a living out of it, and by
those stern British sociologists and anthropologists
who are about as ready to admit that culture has
a legitimate part to play iii social explanation as
a Luther that indulgences might be a means to
salvation. Though they have mellowed somewhat
recently, there was a time when if you called a
British social anthropologist, a "cultural anthro-
pologist", he would react with contemptuous
amazement, unable to believe that anyone could
fail to recognise the difference between a scientific
student of social structure such as himself and,
say, a Margaret Mead or some other purveyor of
entertaining speculations to the Book of the
Month Club. Nor have their sociologist cousins
been immune from the feeling that culture,
attitudes, value systems are somewhat improper
concerns. A recent Ph.D. thesis on the British
engineering profession devoted its first, and only
eloquent, chapter to pouring scorn on the notion
that the low status accorded to engineers in
British society might in any way be explained by
the cultural ethos of Oxbridge in particular or of
the British upper middle class in general.
Why the flight from culture?
One element in all this is presumably the desire
to be scientific, to deal, like the natural scientist,
in hard, quantifiable, structural data. (Though
God knows not all the arguments of those who
consider that, say, the analysis of class structures
is the beginning and end of sociology deal in
data that are hard and quantifiableor, indeed, in
any data at all.) Perhaps, more fundamentally, it
is just a matter of wanting to be academic, to
distinguish one's own professional sociology from
the pop-sociology of the newspaper columnist.
After all, that the Germans are methodical, the
Ghanaians gay, the poor feckless or the upper
class self-confident, is what everybody says. The
academic justifies his existence by pointing out the
non-obvious. He scores even more points by
demonstrating that what seems obvious to the
layman is in fact untrue.
Perhaps, too, there is an element of machismo
involved. The academic world has the reputation
of being somewhat cissy. Some of the aggres-
siveness of America's Vietnam policies has been
attributed to the need of the White House intel-
lectuals, imported from academia, to show that
they too had hairs on their chests. Social scientists
may affect a certain cynicism for the same
reasons. That may be why a model of man as
activated exclusively by motives of material self
interest (a useful heuristic simplifying assumption
for anybody to use on the road to a more com-
prehensive explanation) may be taken as an actual
picture of realityas it is, by and large, by both
of those partial heirs of the (much richer) classi-
cal tradition of political economy: the Marxist
sociologist/political economist and the neo-
classical economist (who curiously believe them-
selves to be so fundamentally opposed to each
other.)
The flight from culture among students of
development has an important added element of
coursewhite man's guilt. American academics
used not to be so subject to it, and it was pri-
marily Americans who in the 1950s and early
1960s created, out of elements of older socio-
logical traditions and a little empirical observa-
tion, a sociology of development which gave con-
siderable importance to attitudes, value prefer-
ences, world views and the nature of the affectual
and moral ties that bind men together in society
When they talked about the social changes whici
were both the consequence of economic growth
and usually also preconditions for further growth
(or, if less often, about the preconditions for an
egalitarian social order)whether it was in terms
of the enlargement of empathy, or a switch from
particularistic to universalistic norms, or a move
from ascription to achievementthey were not
talking nonsense. But they did often vastly over-
simplifyin two important respects.
First, they omitted to mention all the other
obstacles to the development of poor countries
apart from those countries' own structural and
cultural deficiencieslike the fact that many of
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their economies had become cripplingly geared
to the export of primary products, or that they
had to try to trade in a world in which the rich
countries controlled monetary and trading systems
in their own interests. They were perfectly right
to leave these things to the economists to analyse,
but their failure even to mention them did lay
them open to the charge of pollyanna optimism.
Secondly, there seemed to be more than a whiff
of ethnocentrism in their frequent implied con-
trast between a general syndrome of (desirable)
modernity which characterised the rich countries
and one of (backward) traditionalism which
characterised the poor countries. Why, they
seemed to be saying, can't those wretched
Venezuelans, Indians, Ruandans, be achieve-
ment-motivated, future-orientated, universalistic
in short modernjust like us.
And, indeed, that was roughly (or rather, "how
can one accelerate the forces that would make
them achievement-orientated, etc., etc., like us")
what they were sayingand in a sense legiti-
mately so. (What is it, after all, that most people
have in mind when they would deny to affluent
Kuwait the title 'modern' or 'developed' society?)
But by the late sixties those ceased to be politic
or congenial things to say. White man's guilt,
which had always made ex-imperial Englishmen
hesitate to say things that might be construed as
derogatory to the inhabitants of former colonies,
began to afflict Americans too. ("White man's
guilt" being, here, shorthand for a complex
phenomenon, one important element of which is
the revolt of affluent society youth and their urge
to pin the blame for as much of the world's sins
as possible on their own fathers/rulers.) In an
America in which the Vietnam war was becom-
ing increasingly condemned as naked imperialism,
the 'dependency school' or the 'under-develop-
ment school' was on strong emotional ground in
attacking the modernization theorists for smugly
glossing over the external constraints on economic
growth. And in a world in which more and more
Third World countries were getting their own
universities and their own sociologists of develop-
ment, new and different ethnocentrisms were
brought into play. Peru's sociologists, or Senegal's
or Tunisia's, were not so happy to have their
country's troubles diagnosed as basically laziness
or narrow-mindedness, however jargonised the
diagnosis might be in terms of achievement-
orientation scores or empathy ratings.
The current orthodoxy
And so the tide has turned. Values, culture, be-
havioural dispositions are out. The reading lists
of Sociology of Development courses in this
country are dominated by amateur economics:
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the talk is all of hard 'structural' matters like
metropolises and peripheries, and hegemonie and
subordinate modes of production. The message
is that the real villain of the piece is global
capitalism; that we are allthe working class
and the oppressed academic under-class in the
rich countries, the Moroccans and Indians and
Puerto Ricansequally its victims, equally
brothers in misery. And that there is nothing
much to be done about it except to try to raise
the level of consciousness.
What is taught and written under the rubric
"sociology of development" in Britain is not of
much consequence to anybody but its self-
indulgent teachers and students. But what is
taught and written in Quito or Delhi, or Dar es
Salaam is more important. A view of develop-
ment problems exclusively informed by the
'victim consciousness' of the dependency pers-
pective (they have ruined us, they are preventing
us from claiming our birthright) can be a splendid
cop-out for middle class intellectuals enjoying a
(relatively) high standard of living in a develop-
ing society. It can be a standing temptation to
engage in denunciatory rhetoric rather than the
detailed planning of institutional devices (like,
say, the Andean Pact's arrangements to control
the import of technology) which can do something
to protect Third World economies against those
who would try to exploit them. Sociologists have
their contribution to make to such detailed
planning. They can contribute not only 'struc-
tural' interest-group analysis of who would stand
to gain or lose by sabotaging such institutions,
but also cultural and attitudinal analysis of the
motivational resources, the patterns of loyalties,
and the deep structures of cultural norms which
can be mobilised to help in their operationand
of possible ways in which, if those motivational
resources are not there in the existing cultural
traditions, they might be fostered by better
planning of, say, the educational system.
Intertwined
In short, any analysis of social situations which
does not look at both structural and cultural
factors is liable to be partial and misleading-
and the way in which the two sets of factors can
be inextricably intertwinedin constraining or
promoting the building of successful private busi-
nesses in Ghana on the one hand, in fostering
successful sugar co-operatives in Maharashtra on
the otheris well illustrated in the papers of
Paul Kennedy and Baburao Baviskar.
Intertwining is one thing, causal interrelationship
is another. And, of course, one frequently can
trace cultural features historically to structural
ones, which is not the same thing as to say that
one can reduce them to structural ones. "Struc-
turalists" have little trouble accepting that part of
the "culture of poverty" thesis which suggests
that material deprivation produces similar cul-
tural traits in a wide variety of societies. What
is often rejected as a priori inadmissable is the
idea that those cultural traits can have any
independent influence either in perpetuating the
condition of poverty, or in continuing to affect
behaviour if the poverty were cured. (The
parallel thesis that the British upper middle class
continues to socialise its young as if there was
still an empire to be ruled may not be thought
quite so unacceptable.) It is such a priori dismis-
sal that Robert Wade's article is concerned to
challengea complement to an earlier article in
which he challenged the validity of the more
extravagant versions of the culture of poverty
thesis itself.
Peter Lloyd is also in part concerned with the
culture of the students of culturewith observing
wryly the subtle variations in the uses made of
the term 'marginality' by Latin American social
scientists, but he also has some interesting things
to say about the usefulness of the concept itself.
John Peel illustrates some general problems of
cultural relativity by reminding us that not only
are the means by which social change is achieved
subject to cultural variation, but so, most im-
portantly, are the objectives, and that any
sociology of development which does not take
off from a respectful examination of what
'development' means to other people is very
seriously open to the charge of ethnocen-
trism. Finally, Mick Moore reflects on some
aspects of the culture of a particular and very
interesting social grouprural development
administrators. Such particular characteristics as
their 'programmatism' are not easily to be ex-
plained, he suggests, solely in terms of their
location in the economic structure.
Culture, class and policy
Our reviews include a film review from Dudley
Seers which is not only a contribution to the
continuing debate on what happened in Chile
and why, but also a penetrating discussion of
the responsibilities of the left-wing media-
whether to deal in 'consciousness-raising' myth
or in instructive history. (A question, perhaps,
to be pondered also by others who would not
normally classify themselves as part of the
'media'.) José Villamil takes a cold hard look at
an optimistic Third World symposium on the
possibilities of creating a new international
economic order, and finally we have a variety
of different perspectives on the latest British
White Paper on aid policies. Whether three
Englishmen and one indian represent a balanced
panel may be questioned, but at least they offer
interesting contrasts which students of both
structures and cultures might find interesting to
explore.
All three reviews (to draw this grist too into
the mill of our central theme) raise interesting
questions about culture. How much of the
Allende tragedy can be traced to a cultural gulf
inhibiting communication (vide Mick Moore on
peasants and bureaucrats for a parallel) between
groups such as the copper miners on the one
hand and on the other the middle-class univer-
sity-trained leftists who predominated in the UP
administrationand whose counterparts form
the potential audience for the Franco-Bulgarian
film which Dudley Seers reviews? (It is not
likely, apropos of his concern with the film's
effects, to be the Renault workers among Com-
munist Party members who flock to see it in
Paris.) José Villamil ends his review with a
sceptical reference to the transnational élite re-
presented in his symposium. But one might say,
too, that it is precisely the development of a
transnational cultural unity among Third World
élites which is necessary if perceptions of common
interests are to be developed strongly enough
for the Third World countries to press home
what realistic 'structural' advantages they do have
in the post-OPEC world (albeit that, realistically,
that culture is bound to be a variant of Anglo-
phone international-organisation culture). As for
the White Paper, an interesting question is how
much the easy acceptance of the new "more aid
to the poorest" strategy in rich country aid
agencies owes to a new-found egalitarianism, and
how much to older cultural traditions which have
always seen charity as being properly reserved
for the deserving poor.
R.P.D.
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